The Debate on Australian Federalism: Local Government Financial Interrelationships with State and Commonwealth Governments
It is now widely accepted that good governance of an advanced modern economy will typically involve some combination of local and central government decision-making, especially in countries which cover vast geographic areas, like Australia, Canada and the United States. Nevertheless, considerable current interest has once again been directed at precisely how various public responsibilities should be allocated between the different tiers of government in a federation. In the United States, federalism is firmly back on the public agenda (Donahue 1997) . For instance, Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) have recently proposed three alternative models to inform this debate, namely 'economic federalism', 'cooperative federalism', and 'democratic federalism'. In advocating the investigation of these three principles, Inman and Rubinfeld (1997: 44-45) argue as follows:
In considering the implications of these principles, it is helpful to bear in mind that those who value a federal system typically do so for some mix of three reasons: it encourages and efficient allocation of national resources; it fosters political participation and a sense of the democratic community; and it helps to protect basic liberties and freedoms. The means for implementing these three objectives involve decisions about the institutions of federalism: the number of lower-tier governments, their representation in the central government, and the assignment of policy responsibilities between the vertical tiers of government.
Although still in its infancy, a similar embryonic debate is beginning to take shape in Australia (Galligan 1995) . However, almost all the extant discussion has focussed entirely on federal/state relationships to the virtual exclusion of local government (Sharman 1998) . Given the nature of the Australian Constitution, whilst the neglect of local government in the debate is perhaps understandable, it is nonetheless true that numerous significant issues in the interrelationships between federal, state and local government remain unsettled. The present paper seeks to at least partly remedy this neglect in Inman and Rubinfeld's (1997) 'economic federalism' sphere by reviewing local government financial relationships in Australia and exploring various unresolved questions in this area.
The paper itself is divided into four main parts. The first section examines the sources and composition of Australian local government finance. The second section investigates the nature of financial assistance grants. The controversial question of the efficiency consequences of grant distribution is addressed in the third section. The paper ends with some brief concluding remarks in the final section.
Sources and composition
Local governments in Australia finance their activities from a variety of sources. The main sources are: (i) taxes on property (or municipal rates), (ii) fees and fines (referring to user charges imposed for services rendered and fines associated with regulatory functions), (iii) net operating surplus of public trading enterprises (normally utilities), ( iv) grants from the Commonwealth or respective state government, and (v) interest received from council investments. Taxation by level of government in Australia is outlined in Table 1 . In terms of overall public sector revenue-raising capacity in Australia, the Commonwealth raises approximately 75 percent, the states around 21 percent, and local government about 4 percent. Accordingly, in the Australian federal system, own-source revenues as a percentage of own-purpose outlays (an indicator of vertical fiscal imbalance) are 142 percent for the Commonwealth, 50 percent for the states, and 80 percent for local government.
As itemised in Table 2 , the main sources of revenue for Australian local governments are taxes, fees and fines (46.5%), followed by intergovernmental grants (17.4%) and sale of goods and services (22.9%). A more accurate and comprehensive breakdown of revenue by specific source is unfortunately not available. However, estimates indicate that municipal rates comprise some 90 percent of taxes, fees and charges, with the remainder being mainly garbage fees. Of the grants received, approximately 70 percent are financial assistance grants and specific purpose payments made by the Commonwealth, of which the larger portion are general purpose grants (some 57 percent) and identified local roads grants a further 25 percent. Nevertheless, there is considerable variation in the composition of local government revenue across the states and over time (AURDR 1994a) . For example, the proportion of revenue derived from grants ranges from 33 percent in the Northern Territory to just over 13 percent in Queensland, whilst taxes, fees and fines make up 58 percent of local government revenue in South Australia and just 38 percent in Queensland. The AURDR (1997a: 77) concluded that "if the data on rating support can be seen as a guide to the degree of fiscal imbalance, then it would appear that Queensland and Western Australia have the greatest disparity within their respective states, and Victoria and South Australia the least".
In terms of international comparisons, several points can be raised. In the case of the United States, the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance is reasonably similar to that in Australia, with local government raising about 70 to 80 percent of its own requirements. However, the source of the imbalance is quite different, with the larger portion of funding assistance being made by state rather than federal government. By contrast, in Australia the balance is provided almost exclusively by the federal government. As indicated in Table 3 , the Commonwealth grant for 1997/98 is estimated to be some $1.2 billion; $0.372 billion for the purposes of local roads, and $0.840 billion in financial assistance grants. In the U.S., only about 17 percent of grants to local government are 'block' or general purpose grants, with the remainder being 'categorical' or specific purpose grants. In addition, extensive use is made in the U.S. of federal 'mandates' which dictate the actions of local governments but provide no finance (AURDR 1994a: 17) . However, the main difference between Australia and the United States lies in is the broader range of revenue-raising instruments available to local government in the latter country. These include personal income taxes (providing approximately 5 percent of own-source revenue), corporate income taxes (1 percent), property taxes (74 percent) and taxes on consumption (20 percent). A similar situation holds in other federal OECD countries. For example, in Austria local government raises 34.7 percent of own-source revenue through personal income taxes, 5.5 percent from corporate income taxes, 11.0 percent from payroll taxation, 5.4 percent from property taxes, and 34.5 percent from consumption and other taxes. In Germany and Switzerland, personal income taxes are the primary own-source revenue, providing 66.5 and 76.5 percent of own-source revenues respectively. However, in Canada local governments are equally dependent upon property taxes (80 percent), despite having recourse to residual, mainly business, taxes (18 percent). sum to less than 1 percent of rate revenue, but increase to more than 90 percent for small rural urban areas. This reflects not only the structural composition, rate revenue-capacity, and rating effort of the councils, but also the diverse methodologies employed by the various state governments to allocate financial assistance. These issues will be developed at length in the next section. percent from 1995/96) and $108m for roads (an increase of 4 percent). Direct funding from the NSW State Government on the other hand is mainly channelled as grants for roads or pensioner rate rebates. Local councils manage a specified portion of the road network with a block grant from the Roads and Traffic Authority. In 1994/95 $277m was provided under this system.
Finally, in addition to financial assistance grants, the Commonwealth has also been a significant provider of funding for other services such as childcare, aged, employment and other community welfare programs. Details are provided in Table 5 for fiscal year 1996/97.
These specific purpose payments or SPPs totalled $216.3 million in 1996/97 or more than 20 percent of total Commonwealth grants to local government (excluding the roads component).
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The magnitude and composition of these payments directly reflects the modifications in Commonwealth/local relations.
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One major contribution made by the states to local government is in the form of road finance. For example, councils in NSW maintain a network of 160,000 kilometres of regional and local roads, and 9,000 kilometres on behalf of the state Roads and Transport Authority (RTA). Funding for this purpose amounted to $287 million in 1996/97.
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Specific purpose payments or SPPs are made under Section 96 of the Constitution, whereby Parliament may grant financial assistance to any state on such terms and conditions as it sees fit. There are three types of SPPs: (i) payments 'to' state governments -these are made direct to state governments for funding expenditures by the states; (ii) payments 'through' state governments -payments to state governments to be passed on to other bodies or individuals. The main payments in this category relate to higher education, non-government schools and local government general purpose assistance; and (iii) SPPs made direct to local government.
Most SPPs paid 'to' the states (about 60 percent of the total) are on the condition that policy objectives set by the Commonwealth, or national policy objectives agreed between the Commonwealth and the states, are met. It is because of the conditions attached to SPPs that they are sometimes called 'tied grants'. The Commonwealth can attach conditions to these SPPs to reflect policy objectives in programme areas, and often include requirements for certain levels of spending by the states. SPPs that are paid 'through' the states account for around 39 per cent of total SPPs. These SPPs have a minimal impact on state budgets as they are essentially Commonwealth own -purpose outlays, with the states acting as the Commonwealth's agent. The small number of SPPs paid directly to local government (rather than 'through' the states) currently account for slightly more than 1 percent of the total.
Financial assistance grants
Under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 ( §81), the Commonwealth is given powers to grant financial assistance to any state for any purpose on such terms and conditions as Parliament thinks fit. Nevertheless, Commonwealth assistance to local government did not effectively commence until 1974/75 when untied grants were distributed on the basis of recommendations made by the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC), operating under the Grants Commission Act (1973) . This was the first instance when the CGC was required to review local government finances. Before this, its main role (and that pursued since) had been the allocation between states of Commonwealth general purpose grants. The primary role of the CGC (1993: 6) is to recommend adjustments to the equal per capita distribution of Commonwealth general revenue grant assistance to the states, usually on the basis of fiscal equalisation:
Each state should be given the capacity to provide the same standard of state-type public services as the other states, if it makes the same effort to raise revenues from its own sources and conducts its affairs at an overage level for operational efficiency.
To make these assessments, the CGC identifies 19 revenue and 41 expenditure categories for each state. For each revenue category the tax base available to the state is calculated, along with an average tax rate. Similarly, for each expenditure category, levels are calculated for disability factors outside the control of the state government which affect the provisions of public services. state grant relativities are then adjusted for expenditure and revenue disabilities based on the calculation of a national state average.
The implementation of the principle of fiscal equalisation thereby involves a per capita comparison of summated "standardised expenditure" (or weighted averages of all the categories of recurrent services provided by subnational governments) less any specific purpose payments ( SPPs) which may have been paid with aggregated "standardised revenues" (or the revenue raising capacities of the subnational governments. The outcome of this process, referred to as the standardised budget deficit, provides an assessment of the relative needs of different states for Commonwealth financial assistance.
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As subsequently defined under the Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act (1995: §6) the principle of horizontal equalisation is a basis of distributing funds:
[T]hat ensures that each local governing body in the state is able to function, by reasonable effort, at a standard not lower than the standard of other local governing bodies in the state, and that takes account of differences in the expenditure required by those local governing bodies in the performance of their function and in the capacity of those local governing bodies to raise revenue. income tax revenues and total payments to local government, and to establish the 30 percent per capita grant allocation as a 'safety net' for council revenues.
Additional reports into local government finance and the methodologies used by the state
LGGCs to distribute FAGs followed in 1994; namely, Financing Local Government: A
Review of the Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act 1986 and Local Government
Funding Methodologies. The main finding of these reports was "that the seven different models operating were of little relevance in ensuring equity in grant distribution or allowing for the monitoring of outcomes" (OLG 19976: 59) . Accordingly, the revised Local Closely associated with the framing of the new Act, followed an agreement by Commonwealth, State/Territory ministers and the Australian Local Government Association to a set of principles for allocating general purpose and local road grants. In part, these 6
The Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act (1995: §6) defines the minimum grant such that:
No local governing body in a state will be allocated an amount ... that is less than the amount that would be allocated to the body if 30 per cent of the amount to which the state is entitled . Relevant consideration for the purpose of this principle included the length, type and usage of roads in each local governing area.
Methods used by Local Government Grants Commissions
Despite the fact that the Commonwealth government provides the funding, the actual allocation and distribution of monies to local governments is made through state-based Local Government Grants Commissions (LGGCs). The principles applied by these LGGCs to grant allocation are largely based upon a common legislative core: (i) allocation of funds on a full horizontal equalisation basis; (ii) the functioning of each local government at a standard not lower than the average standard of other local governing bodies in the state; ( iii) the assessment of revenue and expenditure needs and disabilities; and (iv) effort neutrality. The most important consideration here is that the allocation of grants is based on the LGGCs objective assessment of local government needs and disabilities: both expenditure -the differential costs, relative to standard, that a council needs to provide a standard level of services -and revenue -the differential revenues a council would raise if the standardised revenue effort was applied to its revenue base. In the case of expenditure disabilities, factors usually taken into account include socioeconomic, demographic and geographic attributes, whilst revenue disabilities are largely proxied by variance in rateable property value. It is important to note that the horizontal equalisation principles under which these assessments are 7
Under the Local Government Act ( §4); a body declared by the Minister, on the advice of the relevant state Minister, by notice published in the Gazette, to be a local governing body for the purposes of this Act.
8 Effort (or policy) neutrality means that as far as practicable, that policies of individual local governing bodies in terms of revenue and expenditure effort will not affect grant determination. The assessment of a financial assistance grant is therefore effort neutral when it neither rewards nor penalises a council where expenditure or revenue raising patterns vary from the state average because of policy differences, differences in efficiency, or levels of self-help.
made generates "...equalisation of the capacity to provide services, but not the equalisation of outcomes" (AURDR, 1994a: 25) . Furthermore, despite the fact that the various LGGCs derive their existence from a common Act and the state governments have agreed to a set of shared national principles, considerable differences in the state methodologies for funding assistance remain.
Revenue capacity
For most states, differences in the expenditure needs of councils and differences in revenue capacity for revenues other than rates affect grants much less than differences in rate revenue capacity (NOLG 1997: 98) . This supports the case that decisions made by the various LGGCs about the horizontal equalisation of rates revenue will exercise a dominant influence on the redistribution of funds resulting from differential general purpose grants. However, considerable debate has arisen on the efficacy of the use of rateable property values alone as a means of assessing local government revenue raising capacity (as against some other multiple indicator) (NOLG 1997) . Put simply, the debate has been concerned with the differential between a council's theoretical revenue capacity and its actual ability to raise revenue by rates and other means. However, the debate has also been more practically concerned with the impact of different rating systems across the states, and different approaches employed by the various LGGCs, for the stated objective of horizontal equalisation. Previously, special purpose payments (or SPPs) though recognised by the various grants commissions, were excluded from calculations for the purposes of grants, though this was clearly inconsistent with the underlying principle of fiscal equalisation.
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Morton Consulting Services (1996: i) opens the arguments as follows:
The argument about what is revenue capacity tends to centre on whether assessments of capacity should be based on the actual tax base used -property valuation, or whether it is more relevant to assess the capacity of the community to pay -the cash flow of residents. The use of property values includes a notion of underlying wealth of a community whereas the use of indicators such as personal income relates revenue capacity to the current resources available to pay for basic living necessities. Expenditures from local government rates and charges not only provide benefits consumed by residents on an annual basis, but they also act to increase the value of property and hence the wealth of residents of an areas.
assessed annual value (AAV). Substantial differentials exist in the ability of local governments to generate revenue derive from these differences. For example, in a study comparing Tasmanian AAV in relation to capital (improved) and land (unimproved) value, it was found that AAV as a percentage of capital value ranged from 4.5 percent to 11.8 percent, whilst AAV as a percentage of land value ranged from a low of 7.8 percent to a high of 88.7 percent (MCS 1996: 15) . The report (MCS 1996: 15) concluded that "the diversity of situations in many other states would further magnify the extremes between the different valuation systems and the relativities between councils in the assumed rate base".
The assessment of revenue capacity in each state, and consistency across state borders, will also depend on any additional provisions relating to revenue raising practice. The four main considerations are: (i) the use of minimum rates; (ii) pensioner remissions; (iii) differential rates; and (iv) rate capping (NOLG 1997: 100) . First, the main difference between states in minimum rate provisions are whether limits are set on the proportion of total general rates to be raised from a flat charge per property. In Victoria and Tasmania, this limit is set at 20 percent, which serves to minimise the distortion between relative property values and the actual rates raised, implying that assessing revenue disability in these states on the basis of property is more appropriate than the remaining states. Second, across the states discounts for rate remissions also vary. In NSW the discount is set by legislation to a minimum pensioner rebate of 50 percent, whereas in other states these concessions are subject to the discretion of local government. Typically, LGGCs do not adjust revenue assessments for pensioner remissions. Third, in all states and territories there is considerable discretion in the use of differential rates for residential, commercial, industrial property, etc. The differential rating system is seen as one way in which the imposed tax base system can be more closely aligned with capacity to pay. Finally, rate capping or pegging may impact upon the revenue capacity of local governments across states. For example, in NSW councils have been restricted in the use of rating capacity since 1977.
How much revenue assistance is given to local governments will also depend on the methodology employed by the relevant LGGC. Firstly, NSW, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania all rely almost exclusively on the valuation tax base to calculate revenue capacity.
How closely these methods approximate the underlying revenue raising capacity will generally depend on the property valuation technique employed. For example, it is assumed that incomes in the community are most closely approximated by rental value (as in Tasmania), followed by improved capital values (as in South Australia), followed by unimproved values. In Queensland a combination of indicators of revenue capacity are used.
These include (ranked in order of magnitude): rateable property, gross value of rural production, personal income, an indicator of retail sales, and unimproved capital value. In
Western Australia, the LGGC distinguishes between urban properties, agricultural properties, pastoral properties, and three classes of mining properties. In the Northern Territory the basis of assessment is personal income. Secondly, even though all LGGCs take account of SPPs (in line with the National Principles concerning other revenue sources) there is some variation in the way in which these SPPs are recognised. For instance, in Tasmania grants are averaged over 3 years, with only 80 percent being taken into account, while in NSW, Victoria and Western Australia, various discounting methods are applied.
In general, the debate on assessing the revenue raising capacity in local government, and more importantly, the methods by which grants are allocated to attain horizontal equalisation on the revenue side, remains unresolved. On one hand, the Morton Report (1996) concluded that, other than the efficacy of different rating systems in proxying the true revenue raising capacity of local government, "
LGGCs should use a combination of indicators in their assessment methodology" (MCS 1996: 45) . Furthermore "revenue calculation should not be seen as a calculation of the capacity to raise rates, but as a broader calculation of capacity to raise revenue by whatever means a councils chooses" (MCS 1996: 39 However, the Office of Local Government (1997: 101) has recently concluded that:
[A]nyone comparing the different methods of assessing rating capacity used by Commissions would find it difficult to escape the conclusion that they are too various for all to be consistent with equalisation.
Roads grants
The Commonwealth contributes to the funding of road construction and maintenance through both the local roads and the general purpose components of grants. However, neither part of the grant is tied, and councils generally spend significantly more on roads than the local roads component of the grant received (NOLG 1997).
In NSW some 25 percent of the local roads component is distributed to councils in the Sydney, Newcastle, Wollongong areas, with the remainder of the state receiving the balance.
Of the former, 57 percent is distributed in proportion to road length, 38 percent in accordance with population, and 5 percent to bridge length. For the latter, 74 percent is distributed in proportion to road length, 19 percent to population, and 7 percent to bridges. For the general purpose component, the NSW LGGC distinguishes between urban local, sealed rural, and 
General purpose grants
Although roads are the biggest category of expenditure for many councils, the LGGC in each state assesses between five and thirty classes of expenditure. For each class of expenditure, the LGGCs estimate how much each council, in the circumstances in which it is placed, would have to spend to provide services of average standard. Estimates are guided by the objective assessment of expenditure 'disabilities' (or disability factors) in each class of expenditure, corresponding to postulated systemic influences on expenditure which are beyond a council's control. Consistent with the notion of effort neutrality, the LGGCs do not compensate for cost differences which arise due to policy decisions of the council, management performance, or accounting differences. For example, in Table 6 implying a greater than average per capita cost of service provision, or negative (a cost advantage) implying a lesser than average per capita cost of service provisions. Typically, negative disabilities are not calculated, so that the minimum weighting for the disability is zero. Grants are then applied in proportion to assessed disability factors and standard per capita grants for each category of expenditure.
Across the various states, a great deal of variation exists in the functions (or areas of expenditure) assessed, the types of disability factors taken into account, and the weighting applied to each factor in overall disability calculation. For example, 21 local government functions are assessed in NSW, 20 in Victoria, 18 in South Australia, 11 in Tasmania and only 9 in Western Australia. In the interests of brevity, we will examine only the New South Wales LGGC's (NSWLGGC) methodology in more detail. Selected details on other state methodologies may be found in NOLG (1997). In NSW expenditure allowances are calculated for 21 functions or areas of expenditure (NSWLGGC 1994) . These functions include general administration services, airports, services for the aged and disabled, cultural amenities, control of animals, general health services, library services, recreational services, stormwater damage and flood mitigation, street light, and street and gutter cleaning. An additional allowance is calculated for those councils operating outside the Sydney statistical divisions to reflect isolation. The disability factor assessed for any particular function depends primarily on the disability (or disabilities) being assessed. For example, as shown in Table 7 , aged and disabled services, building control, and children's services are assessed on the basis of three disabilities, whereas town planning has eight assessable disability factors. The individual disability (or council measure) is then divided by the state standard (usually the average) and weighted by some factor which reflects the significance of the measure in terms of the expected additional cost.
For example, the disability factor applied to per capita grants for town planning expenditure is a function of eight individual disabilities. These are: (i) population growth, which recognises the additional cost of forward planning in high growth areas; (ii) development activity, a regression-based measure of building approvals; (iii) non-residential properties, indicating the greater complexity of processing development applications; ( iv) heritage/environment, additional costs due to greater complexity in plan preparation and control; (v) regional centre Grant allowances for the majority of functions are ultimately calculated by multiplying the number of units to be serviced by the standard expenditure per unit for that function and the disability factor for the function in percentage terms. Generally, the number of units serviced is measured by the number of properties most relevant to the function, i.e. non-urban properties for noxious weed control, urban properties for street lighting. However, the LGGCs calculation of equalisation grants is made without reference to the funds made available by the Commonwealth. The actual equalisation grant made to a council will therefore depend on a number of additional factors that vary from year to year. The first is the re-scaling of the notional grant to the funds made available by the Commonwealth, and the second is the bringing up of councils below the per capita minimum entitlement to that level (i.e. if 30 percent of the funds available were distributed on a per capita basis). Once this is done, each council receives approximately 60 percent of the amount assessed as need. Therefore the distribution of grants within any state on a full horizontal equalisation basis is unlikely to be achieved (AURDR 1994a: 19) . Problems certainly exist because of conceptual difficulties, data limitations and the subjective nature of examination. However, the primary barrier to full horizontal equalisation, independent of the overall fund allocation by the Commonwealth, is the statutory requirement of a per capita minimum grant (NOLG 1997: 25) .
Efficiency and grant distribution
To date, the Commonwealth has not required the LGGCs to pay explicit attention in grant allocation to the efficiency with which local councils operate. 11 The reasons for this are threefold. First, under the Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act horizontal equalisation has been the major policy goal. Second, the phrase 'by reasonable effort' in the legislation has largely been interpreted to refer solely to the rating effort of councils, and does not take into account any matters concerning reasonable efforts to ensure economic efficiency. Finally, the assumption of 'effort neutrality' which relates to policy decisions by councils, has been interpreted to mean that councils should not be able to act in a manner which affects their grant (AURDR 1994a: 13) . 12 Accordingly, grants to councils only reflect factors beyond their control, and therefore the LGGC grants process neither rewards nor penalises councils with differing levels of efficiency.
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However, it has been argued that LGGC methodologies have influenced the efficiency of local councils, irrespective of their lack of legislative mandate (AURDR 1994a). 14 Both
11
There is currently no restriction on the Commonwealth actually pursuing efficiency as an objective in the local government grants process. The AURDR (1994a: 15) identifies several reasons why the Commonwealth may wish to intervene in grant outcomes in the future: "each council is a productive unit and thus a contributor to the effective operation of the local, regional and national economies ... it is in the interest of all that councils make a sensible evaluation of potential new capital expenditure ... [and] improvement in council operations over time requires innovation and experimentation ... it may be appropriate for the Commonwealth to finance pilot projects.
12
The AURDR (1994a: 21) argued that "the need for central government concern over local government efficiency depends on the significance of grants as a source of local authority revenue". The approach used to address these concerns in the U.S. (where grants are relatively low) is a combination of grant-matching, specific purpose payments, and low levels of financial assistance. By contrast in the U.K. (where own-source income is relatively low) these concerns have been addressed structurally (i.e. through compulsory tendering and privatisation) rather than through grant mechanisms. The AURDR (1994a: 21) reasoned that "Australia sits in the middle" of these two approaches.
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The main issue addressed by the Commonwealth in this regard relates to complexity in the grants process. At present, "complexity in LGGC methodology is of little concern to the Commonwealth ... however, if at odds with the intent of the current Act, council actions do influence their grants or the Commonwealth wishes to increase it emphasis on council productive efficiency or the Commonwealth takes the view that more than money is necessary to improve the 'political' efficiency of councils, then complex LGGC methodology maybe counter to the Commonwealth's interest" (AURDR 1994a: 13).
14 The AURDR (1994a: 108) reported four options available to promote efficiency through the grants system. First, the process approach would advise councils of comparative costs, and warn inefficient councils of the need to improve efficiency, and reward efficient councils with efficiency 'dividends'. The element approach would introduce efficiency directly in the grants mechanism with an efficiency bonus. The managerial approach would audit councils on the achievement of a predetermined efficiency measure, and pay an efficiency dividend on achievement. Finally, the positive and negative factors have been identified. On one hand, it has been argued that "by providing the highest per capita support to those councils with revenue raising difficulties and expenditure needs in regard to size, sparcity, location and cost disabilities, [the grants system] may not be conducive to an efficient allocation if resources" (AURDR 1994a: 55) . IPART (1998: 39) likewise supported this contention:
The Federal Assistance Grants Act 1995 provides a direct grant for local government against formulae determined by each state through the Grants Commission to equalise the effect of remoteness and size. This formula actually creates and encourages inefficiency by retaining small institutions…[It has been proposed] that the grant formula should not fully and automatically compensate councils to the full extent of higher overhead costs associated with remoteness and size as it reduces the incentive to form larger organisations or to become more efficient."
Alternatively, it has been observed that "councils which are cost effective may be rewarded through unit cost adjustments up to the standard if their operations are cost effective" (AURDR 1994a: 14) . For example, the NSW Local Government Grants Commission (NSWLGGC 1994: 16) has argued that the grants process indirectly rewards efficient councils:
Because if the effort neutral approach a council's grant is assessed independent of policy decisions by councils, a council that provides a cost effective service still receives grant funding which it can allocate to its priorities. For example, two councils which were identical in every respect except efficiency would receive identical grants. The efficient council can use its grant funds to provide even better facilities for the rate payers. The inefficient council of the two would need to apply the grant funds to prop up an inefficient operation.
However, the Grants Commission 's (1994: 16) argument that "the use of council's expenditure in the calculations [expenditure disabilities] is limited to determining a state standard cost for each selected function" ignores the impact of several inefficient or efficient councils on grant outcomes. For example, suppose that councils' expenditure in a particular function is broadly efficient. In the case of industry wide efficiency this would infer a lower standard cost for that function, irrespective of factors beyond managerial control, thereby putting strong pressure on councils to improve efficiency to the state standard. Alternatively, if the industry standard is broadly inefficient, thereby implying a higher standard expenditure cost, the incentive for councils to improve their inefficiency is removed. At the very least, these factors may serve to institutionalise a given level of efficiency in a given function over benchmark approach would set targets for performance, and reward councils with an allocation of funds proportional to the council's achievement.
time. Moreover, the fact that councils can internally subsidise inefficient functions, combined with the impact of the minimum per capita grant, suggests that any purported financial penalties may be limited. On balance, evidence from the 1993 National Survey of Councils suggests that the grants process used in Australia does influence efficiency, in spite of being overtly effort neutral (AURDR 1994a). As shown in Table 8 , 17.3 percent of all surveyed councils indicated that
LGGC methodologies had encouraged them to be more efficient to a large extent, 41.3 percent to a small extent, and 37.8 percent not at all. Just 12 percent thought that efficiency was not a criteria used by the LGGC in determining grants.
From local governments' viewpoint, this same survey indicated that the grants process is seen to reward inefficiency and penalise efficient councils. The AURDR (1994a: 60) undertook a number of statistical tests to evaluate the hypothesis "that a council with a lower than standard unit expenditure would, after the application of a disability factor, invariably always be given a significantly higher standardised unit expenditure (and consequently a higher grant) and vice versa". The results indicated that a strong relationship did exist between actual unit expenditure and standardised expenditure per capita. The AURDR (1994a: 61) concluded that:
[T]he application of disability factors are serving to improve the grant outcome for councils with low unity expenditures on administration and worsen the grant outcome for councils with high unit expenditures ... there seems to be some support for the proposition that in the way the Commission apply their judgements on disability factors in order to determine standardised expenditures, that
LGGCs are implicitly rewarding [efficient] councils and penalising [inefficient] councils.
However, the study has a number of limitations. First, and foremost, the AURDR (1994a: 63) itself admits that the use of expenditure per capita as a proxy for technical efficiency "has been shown to be inadequate measure". A subsequent analysis found that the chosen measure of efficiency, namely administration expense per capita, was totally unrelated to an alternative measure of efficiency, administration expense as a percentage of total expenditure. Second, the study was based solely on the Victorian Grants Commission, and whilst the AURDR (1994a: 60) argued that the results "are illustrative of the likely outcomes in other states", this is unlikely to be the case given the variation in methodologies across borders. Furthermore, and as indicated earlier in Table 5 , the Victorian Grants Commission takes account of very few disability factors in its allocations. For example, whereas in most states an increasing share of funds has been directed to councils with the highest index of socio-economic disadvantage, the reverse appears to hold in Victoria (AURDR 1994b: xii) . This suggests that the postulated association between efficiency (as measured by per capita administration costs) and grants may not be valid because efficient councils are implicitly being given more income by the grants process. Rather, it may be the case that when the grants methodology fails to correctly account for all disability factors (i.e. those that usually apply to high administration cost councils) all low administration per capita councils, whether efficient or not, are given larger grants than should be the case under horizontal equalisation.
Concluding remarks
In common with all federal systems of government, the Australian fiscal federalism is characterised by fiscal imbalance. Firstly, vertical fiscal imbalances arise because different levels of government have differing capacities to raise revenues to finance expenditure. As we have seen, the power of Australian local government to raise revenue is extremely attenuated.
And secondly, horizontal fiscal imbalances occur since different levels of government, including local government, experience divergent costs in the provision of public goods and do not have equivalent revenue-raising capacities. Whilst most federal countries have pursued formal or informal tax-sharing arrangements between different levels of government, Australia has established a policy of horizontal fiscal equalisation and effort (or policy) neutrality, with the Commonwealth distributing grants to both local and state government.
Indeed, it has been cogently argued that "Australia has developed the most comprehensive, effective and equitable system of fiscal equalisation in the world" (Matthews 1994: 16) .
However, despite the fact that the Commonwealth government provides the funding, the actual allocation and distribution of monies to local governments is made through state-based
LGGCs. The principles applied by these LGGCs to grant allocation are largely based upon a common legislative core: (i) allocation of funds on a full horizontal equalisation basis; (ii) the functioning of each local government at a standard not lower than the average standard of other local governing bodies in the state; (iii) the assessment of revenue and expenditure needs and disabilities; and (iv) effort neutrality. The most important consideration here is that the allocation of grants is based on the LGGCs objective assessment of local government needs and disabilities and is technically independent of policy-related council decisions, including those relating to efficiency and effectiveness. However, there is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that LGGC methodologies do influence council efficiency, and thereby compromise the primacy of the horizontal equalisation objective.
